These terrorist organizations have enormous resources, many supporters, and appear under different guises. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of regional violence in Iraq while analyzing the actions, intents, motivations, and relationships of the armed groups. The overview will also show that terrorist groups, in order to achieve their political agendas, often specifically target innocent people rather than coalition forces.
Overview of Regional Violence
In In October of 2003, a series of four simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on the Iraqi police and the International Red Cross was quickly followed by a sharp surge in guerilla attacks.
Attacks increased to nearly 50 a day, along with a series of helicopter downings; consequently, Operation Iron Hammer was then launched in the second week of November and it brought back the use of U.S. air power for the first time since the end of the Operation Iraqi Freedom.
As a result, the number of insurgent attacks dropped to an average of 18 a day and, The close cooperation with local leaders was quickly suspended and the U.S. decided that it was time for a major assault to clear the city of insurgents. Consequently, on April 4, 2004, Operation Vigilant Resolve was launched to retake the city and was met with stiff and wellorganized resistance resembling a Soviet-style "defense-in-depth" strategy. After three days of fighting with the U.S. Marines, the insurgents still held three-quarters of the city. 2 That indicates there were many professional fighters among the insurgents; the majority of them were soldiers from the previous Iraqi army.
Political pressure then began to build on the United States and the Governing Council of Iraq because they appeared unable to defeat the insurgents. After only two weeks the U.S. 
Armed Groups
The majority of the armed group fighters do not know their command or the resources of their funds. In addition, they do not know who draws their plans and strategic aims. The majority of them, moreover, do not know their real enemy and their ideology is subsequently unclear. They are a mixture of Islamic, national, patriotic, hireling, criminal, and retaliatory components. Among the insurgents, the Ba'ath party ideology is one of the better-known The armed groups are not unified and they attempt to achieve different goals. The two militia groups, Badr Brigade and Peshmerga, loyally support their parties who won the Iraqi elections.
After their initial escape from the field, the Ba'athists emerged as links in the financial and logistic support for the armed groups. They used the proceeds of 5% percent of the Iraq oil export that they have hoarded from 1972 until the fall of their regime in 2003. This vast amount of wealth has been saved and deposited in international banks under different names. They planned to use this money to return to power. 7 The release of senior Ba'ath party commanders on Dec. 27, 2005, allowed them to once again utilize that money. Ignoring the aims of various armed groups, the Ba'athists stand ready to cooperate with anyone in order to regain authority and return to power, or at least maintain chaos in Iraq since they believe the state of chaos will make them appear to be the best hope for Iraq. They claim that under their command there has been stability and prosperity, and, therefore, they are willing to cooperate even with their previous enemies such as the Communist party. For all of the above reasons, the Ba'athists are a serious threat to Iraqi stability. Foreign volunteers account at most for 10% . . . of the insurgency, the remainder being Iraqi Sunni Arabs. According to the report, most of the foreign insurgents have come from Algeria, Syria, Yemen and Sudan. Saudis form an influential minority in the foreign contingent because of the money they bring and because of the media coverage their deaths generate, the report says. There are joint goals that some armed groups are working to achieve as well. Since some groups are fighting on behalf of regional dictatorships, 21 they fear that Iraq democracy will set a dangerous example to their people and will challenge their authority. Some of the armed groups seek to demolish the new Iraqi political structure which, they think, will hasten the 
Conclusion
Based on this study of the actions, intents, motivations and relationships of the armed groups appearing after the transition of Iraqi sovereignty on June 28, 2004 , the majority of the active armed groups are terrorist groups despite the fact that there is a nationalist Iraqi resistance to the American presence in Iraq. These insurgents use terror as a primary means to achieve their objectives and they attack innocent people instead of the foreign forces since they believe that is the best way to pressure the new Iraqi command; furthermore, they are sure their objectives cannot be accomplished through the normal democratic process. Although they ceased their terrorist actions during the elections process, they have reverted once again to employing violence against the Iraqi people when they discovered that their authority would be 
